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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Electoral planning 
While speculation continues over whether President Yel'tsin will attempt to 
remain in office or in power in some form beyond next year, developments in the 
Kremlin apparat suggest the main priorities for his administration are maximizing 
control over upcoming electoral outcomes and, more specifically, preventing the 
Communists from dominating the next Duma. 
 
In June, President Yel'tsin decreed the creation of a Political Planning 
Administration, which will apparently focus on developing strategies to promote 
the campaigns of Kremlin-approved parties and movements and attempt to 
create favorable conditions for the presidential run of Yel'tsin's yet-to-be-named 
successor. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 11 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0617 
<www.fedworld.gov>) Full details on the administration have not yet been 
published. 
 
The creation of a new media ministry also suggests Kremlin concern with 
controlling access for parties and candidates, as well as the quality of coverage 
during the election. Mikhail Lesin, who played a key role in Yel'tsin's 1996 
reelection campaign, has been tapped to head up the new ministry. (NOVYE 
IZVESTIYA REPORT, 14 Jul 99; <www.russiatoday.com>) The Communist Party 
(CPRF), if it is not banned, can probably count on its political ads running 
sometime around 3 a.m. during the election campaigns. 
 
The MVD is also getting involved in "monitoring" the campaigns with the task of 
preventing the election of "criminal elements." In an interview on NTV (1540 
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GMT, 24 May 99; BBC World Broadcast, via nexis), MVD Minister Vladimir 
Rushailo explained his service's role in the process: "We provide information to 
the electoral commissions on the existence of compromising material on specific 
candidates, so that preventative measure can be taken at the pre-election stage 
in line with the law." Rushailo claims the MVD is hoping to close off the option of 
criminals taking up parliamentary seats to gain immunity from prosecution. 
Unfortunately, the definition of a criminal is a highly political act in Yel'tsin's 
Russia. 
 
The issue of campaign financing also got a boost from the apparent deal struck 
between the head of the Unified Energy System (UES), Anatoli Chubais, and the 
Kremlin. A new voting rule, supported by the president, will make removing 
Chubais from his post extremely difficult, and in return Yel'tsin's chief of staff, 
Voloshin, has been named chairman of the Board of Directors. In addition, former 
prime minister and Yel'tsin's Kosovo negotiator, Viktor Chernomyrdin, is back at 
the helm of Gazprom as chairman of the Board of Directors. (RUSSIA TODAY 
FEATURE REPORT, 7 Jul 99; <www.russiatoday.com>) It also seems likely that 
changes will be made at Rosvooruzheniye, which is currently headed up by 
Primakov appointee Grigori Rapota. Following the 1996 campaign, allegations 
surfaced that Rosvooruzheniye provided significant funding for the president's 
electoral efforts. 
 
Speculation is also rampant over the president's desire to ban the CPRF. The 
underlying premise of all the theories in this category is that the apparat will 
attempt to provoke the CPRF into staging a rowdy demonstration, which will 
result in its exclusion from the upcoming campaigns. The latest rumor holds that 
Yel'tsin will order the removal of Lenin's body from its mausoleum and conduct a 
hasty burial. Should the CPRF remain unprovoked, there is concern that the 
apparat will simply stage an act of anti-Semitism, blame it on the Communists 
and ban them as extremists. 
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Former Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov's return to Moscow from abroad, where 
he was recuperating from back surgery, has thrown a bit of a monkey wrench in 
the Kremlin's plans. It appears that Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov 
are moving closer to a political alliance that could prove both immensely popular 
and broad-based. Luzhkov and Primakov met recently, but there has apparently 
been no formal decision on cooperation. (REUTERS, 13 Jul 99; 
<www.russiatoday.com>) 
 
GOVERNMENT 
New defense appointments 
Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin recently announced new appointments in the 
defense sector, apparently made on the basis of suggestions by Ilya Klebanov, 
the vice premier in charge of military issues. Zinovi Pak has been named as 
general director of the Russian Munitions Agency and Vladimir Pospelov will 
serve as general director of the Shipbuilding Agency. (ITAR-TASS, 15 Jun 99; 
nexis) Aleksandr Nozdrachev is the new director-general of the government's 
Agency for Conventional Weapons and Vladimir Simonov was appointed 
director-general for the agency overseeing Command and Control Systems. It is 
also noted that Oleg Leonov will head up the Executive Staff of the government's 
Directorate for Cooperation with International Financial Organizations. (ITAR-
TASS, 1558 GMT, 16 Jun 99; nexis) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
'Globalizing' security 
As peacekeeping troops were deployed in Kosovo, the Russian foreign ministry 
stepped up its campaign to bind NATO to international organizations and develop 
a "European" security system. 
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Moscow appears to place its greatest hopes in the United Nations. In a meeting 
with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov 
stressed the importance of financing "restoration in Kosovo and the entire 
Yugoslavia," despite US insistence that no aid go to "rump Serbia" until Slobodan 
Milosevic leaves office. Russian President Boris Yel'tsin and Annan agreed, a 
Russian spokesman said, that security and stability in Europe could be best 
protected if the UN adopted a "multipolar world" model. (INTERFAX, 0852 GMT, 
24 Jun 99; FBIS-EEU-1999-0624 <www.fedworld.gov>) Opposition to such a 
model would only come from "those who want to impose a one-dimensional 
model on the world," Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said. (INTERFAX, 
0857 GMT, 29 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0629 <www.fedworld.gov>)  
 
The foreign ministry released a number of trial balloons about reforms needed to 
strengthen the UN's hand: Membership on the Security Council might be 
extended to Germany and other states, or its major operations could be handed 
over to the G-7 plus Russia and China, to make a new G-9. Only a stronger UN 
could help "to avoid anarchy in international relations," Ivanov said. The 
Yugoslav crisis had shown the need to take law into account in international 
relations. Russia, he added, would join efforts to "return the situation in [sic] a 
legal aspect." (ITAR-TASS, 1607 GMT, 8 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0708 
<www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
Also high on the Russian agenda are new attempts to build a common European 
security structure, even at the expense of the United States. Proposing the 
adoption of a new European Security Charter, Ivanov said NATO's "unilateral use 
of force" had presented Europe with a choice between old divisions and new 
European unity. "A durable European architecture can be built on common 
European beginnings," Ivanov said; a charter could "become Europe's political 
constitution in the 21st century." (INTERFAX, 1556 GMT, 8 Jul 99; FBIS-EEU-
1999-0708 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
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The Russian foreign ministry is so faithful to the "multipolar" doctrine first laid out 
by Yevgeni Primakov that his removal from high office appears inconsequential. 
Either the doctrine has sunk in, or the ministry does not anticipate that his 
absence from power will be permanent. Primakov himself gave the proposed 
reforms the momentum of a veiled threat. There were two options, Primakov 
wrote in a Dutch newspaper. The NATO countries would admit "they committed a 
strategic error by acting the way they did in Kosovo"; the United Nations would 
then return to "the pedestal from which it was taken down." The alternative, too 
dark to contemplate, would be that the US continues on its belligerent course by, 
for example, pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative. In this case, the most 
popular candidate for the Russian presidency wrote, his country would "build up 
its military strength again, despite its economic problems, which would have 
major consequences for the democratic process today." (ALGEMEEN 
DAGBLAD, 30 Jun 99, p. 10; FBIS-WEU-1999-0701 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
Hard bargaining with NATO 
Having squeezed into post-war peacekeeping in Kosovo, the Russian 
government is negotiating hard to leverage changes to the NATO structure that 
would outlast the operation itself. 
 
Although the status and position of Russian troops had purportedly been settled 
in talks in June, the US Department of State trusted Russian intentions so little 
that in early July it asked Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania to close their airspace 
to Russian transport planes. According to a report in Moskovsky komsomolets, 
the Russian military had apparently planned to use its surprise June move into 
Pristina as the first step towards seizing its own sector, but got cold feet at the 
last minute. (MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS, 2 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0702 
<www.fedworld.gov>) Russian generals working with NATO in Brussels picked 
up where the commanders had left off -- seeking, for example, a presence in the 
Italian zone that might expand to become a separate Russian sector. 
(Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 6 Jul 99) While talks continued, Russian 
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bombers participating in military exercises penetrated NATO airspace twice, 
forcing jets stationed in Iceland and Norway to scramble. 
 
Although Moscow was willing to discuss its work with NATO in the Balkans, 
Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev insisted that all other cooperation 
depended on NATO's agreeing to act only in consultation with the United Nations 
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Russia would also 
have to play a greater role in NATO decision making through the Permanent 
Joint Council. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 9 Jul 99; nexis) 
 
Playing for keeps 
Throughout talks on deployment of troops, Russian officials stressed that their 
interests lay in constructing a world order that would put NATO's military at the 
disposal of international organizations. They were not shy, however, about 
describing the Russian interests that lay behind their moves. "The Balkans," 
Ivanov said, "have always been and will remain a region of our strategic and 
geopolitical interests. Therefore, Russia must ensure stability in the Balkans and 
safeguard its national interests in this region." (INTERFAX, 0921 GMT, 25 Jun 
99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0625 <www.fedworld.gov>) Russia's use of the "Kosovo 
conflict" to strengthen its influence over the NATO alliance shows that its leaders 
understand a connection between stability and their country's interests. It is not 
that stability is in their interest per se, but rather that they have a great interest in 
shaping how "stability," in the Balkans and elsewhere, is pursued. 
 
Russia's expanding Asian dialogue 
Russia's relations with its Asian neighbors are clearly expanding. This is not new; 
Russia has pursued a policy of multipolarism for several years that has stressed 
development of relations with Asian states. However, the Kosovo crisis has 
provided fertile grounds for Russian condemnation of perceived unipolar actions 
by the US. Meanwhile, Russia has touted its own multipolar policy as the 
nonviolent, diplomatic option. Not surprisingly, in the wake of Iraq and Kosovo, 
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Moscow's rhetoric has appealed to many Asian and Middle Eastern states 
concerned about future NATO escapades that could threaten stability in their 
regions as well. In this anti-Western context, Russia has begun to reap the 
benefits of increased economic, political and military ties to several key Asian 
countries. 
 
Relations with China have constituted the most impressive turnaround for 
Russia. In March, the two countries expanded their relations to a new "strategic 
cooperative partnership." Under this agreement, Russia and China have already 
concluded several diplomatic exchanges as well as economic and military 
agreements. In June, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Peng met with Russian 
Federation Council Vice President Oleg Korolev to discuss improving regional 
cooperation. (XINHUA, 1247 GMT, 22 Jun 99; FBIS-CHI-1999-0623 
<www.fedworld.gov>) Also in mid-June, the countries signed a border protocol 
meant to reduce border violations and Premier Stepashin signed a resolution 
designed to facilitate trade along the Russian-Chinese border. (ITAR-TASS, 
1320 GMT, 1 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0702 <www.fedworld.gov>) Following a 
visit by China's top general, Zhang Wannian, Russian radio reported Chinese 
intentions to buy 72 Su-70 aircraft, a lucrative deal for Russia. (RADIO ROSSII, 
1000 GMT, 15 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0615 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
In bilateral disputes like the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan, Russia 
has relied upon its "diplomacy first" rhetoric to encourage an Indo-Pakistani 
dialogue while simultaneously reaping arms sales benefits from India. Russia has 
long seen bilateral ties, with India and China in particular, as necessary 
components of its multipolar strategy. Throughout late June and early July, India 
and Pakistan both approached Russia for help in resolving the issue, but Russia 
declined a formal mediation role that would require a neutral stance. (PIONEER, 
24 Jun 99; FBIS-NEA-1999-0624 <www.fedworld.gov>) Instead, Russia has 
begun deliveries of anti-aircraft missile launchers and India has expressed 
interest in purchasing "hundreds of tanks, S-200 PMU anti-aircraft systems, latest 
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versions of warplanes and ships and submarines." (ITAR-TASS, 0632 GMT, 26 
Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0626 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
In Southeast Asia, Russia has signed a $115 million contract with Bangladesh for 
MiG-29 fighter planes while Vietnam has purchased Su-27 fighters and military 
training at Russian military institutes. (INTERFAX, 1230 GMT, 2 Jul 99; FBIS-
SOV-1999-0626 <www.fedworld.gov>) At a recent meeting in Moscow, the 
Russian and Vietnamese defense ministers signed a military technical 
cooperation agreement. (XINHUA, 2101 GMT, 2 Jul 99; FBIS-CHI-1999-0702 
<www.fedworld.gov>) Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev promised "to 
render comprehensive assistance to the Vietnamese friends in the promotion of 
the military-technical cooperation." In this deal, the political and economic 
implications of the meeting seem more significant than the military ones, since 
Russia has sold to Vietnam in the past. According to Russian Deputy Prime 
Minister Ilya Klebanov, the issue of military and arms sales should be 
approached "politically" since both countries are committed to the same political 
goal of ensuring peace in the region. (XINHUA, 2101 GMT, 2 Jul 99; FBIS-CHI-
1999-0702 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
Relations with China, India, Bangladesh and Vietnam are only a few examples of 
Russia's eastward and southern tilt. As long as multipolarism continues to 
provide solid economic and political rewards, Russia will remain an eager 
exponent in expanding Asian relations. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
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Luzhkov's Fatherland party shows internal division 
Nothing is certain in politics, especially in Russia. But one of the more stable 
islands in the party system seemed to be Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov's 
popularity and his Fatherland party, which he hopes will enter the next Duma and 
perhaps ride him into the Kremlin in the presidential elections scheduled for next 
summer. All is not serene within Fatherland, however. One of the party's allies is 
the Congress of Russian Communities (CRC), initially set up by Krasnoyarsk 
governor and former presidential aide, Aleksandr Lebed. Its present leader, 
Leonid Rogozin, has hinted that a split may be in the works. Even so, considering 
that the CRC is too small to get into the Duma alone, let alone the president's 
office, Rogozin's recent statements might only be the wail of a child trying to get 
his parent, in this case Fatherland, to take notice. 
 
Rogozin is angry about two facts, the first being that Luzhkov has managed to 
move up the date of the mayoral elections to coincide with the Duma elections in 
December. In an interview, Rogozin suggested that Luzhkov was not concerned 
with the future welfare of the party but only in himself. 
 
"At the beginning we agreed on different things. We counted on the fact that 
Luzhkov would be heading Fatherland in the future, and now the situation has 
changed. I doubt that he can head Fatherland's electoral list [for State Duma 
elections] if he runs at the same time for Moscow mayor." (NTV, 1200 GMT, 14 
Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0614 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
Rogozin is also annoyed that Luzhkov is talking with the All-Russia political 
movement about association. Again Rogozin notes that, "the All Russia coalition 
includes people like [Ingush President Ruslan] Aushev, [Tatar President 
Mintimer] Shaymiyev, and others. I think these people are very dubious figures 
for the CRC. They represent the strengthening of Tatarstan or Ingushetia as 
states within a state. [I do not like] their association with Chechen field 
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commander] Shamil Basayev, for example, when we think that the proper place 
for a person like that is hanging from a tree." (Ibid.) 
 
His antipathy toward All-Russia is perhaps less vexing when one considers that 
the CRC considers itself to be a national-patriotic bloc. It is hard to pin down the 
exact meaning of "national-patriotism," but it appears to be a largely rudderless 
form of paranoid xenophobia, complete with a persecution complex stemming 
from assumptions of Western perfidy with regard to Russia. "National-patriotic" 
party platforms, such as there are, say little about the economy or how to 
improve peoples' lives. Instead they opt for anti-Western diatribe that 
masquerades as policy. It is always easy to blame misery on somebody else. 
 
The All-Russia bloc, by extension, is not a national-patriotic movement, although 
exactly what it is remains similarly unclear. However, of the many differences 
between the two movements, in this context the CRC is less opposed to 
centralized solutions to the country's ills than All-Russia, which is comprised by 
regional governors. The chaotic state of Russian political ideology makes it 
difficult to identify clear cleavages around which parties can be seen to organize; 
they tend rather to be administrative extensions of particular politicians. But the 
regionalist/centralist division is slowly becoming a recurring feature of Russian 
political ideology. This is, of course, common if not ubiquitous in every 
federalized political system, and apparently, even one as malformed as Russia's. 
 
Regardless of Rogozin's choice, Fatherland will most likely succeed or fail 
without him or his party. In the same interview Rogozin threatens that Moscow 
Mayor Luzhkov may face a challenger for his job more powerful than former 
prime minister Sergei Kirienko, who has purportedly announced his intention to 
run. One wonders if the "swan" of Krasnoyarsk longs to escape his present 
troubles and fly to the lake of Moscow city politics. 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
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Marshaling support for the upcoming Duma elections 
Many observers of Russia's nascent democracy wondered what effect Sergei 
Stepashin's elevation to prime minister would have on the upcoming Duma and 
presidential elections considering his close relationship with the Federal Security 
Service (FSB) and other marshal authorities. It seems that he intends to 
"oversee" the elections to ensure a "fair" outcome. 
 
Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Vladimir Putin said that "[The elections] 
must take place in terms defined by the Constitution, in full compliance with the 
norms of election legislature. They must be free, equal, and democratic." In order 
to achieve this, the FSB will monitor campaign spending and "dig up information 
about illegalities." (ITAR-TASS, 1037 GMT, 29 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0629 
<www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
It is not immediately clear if the present legislation under which the FSB operates 
is sufficient to allow this apparent increase in the scope of its investigatory 
powers, nor, more importantly, if such irregularities are discovered, whether the 
judiciary is in any way capable of dispatching the cases brought before it. If the 
past is any guide, "evidence" is ipso facto proof of guilt, and protestations of 
innocence are, additionally, proof of guilt. The danger lies not only in the 
potentiality of illegal searches on the part of the FSB but, given the sorry state of 
the Russian judicial process, a simple mention of "evidence" of guilt discovered 
by the FSB could cast a troublesome candidate or party out of the elections. 
 
Putin did say that the FSB would not violate human rights in any way and that, "a 
throwback to the past is out of the question," but all of that remains to be seen. 
(Ibid.) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
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Stepashin confident about CIS future 
Following the flurry of activity at the beginning of the month (see The NIS 
Observed, 23 Jun 99), June was a relatively quiet month in CIS relations. At the 
First World Conference of the Russian Press on 21 June, Premier Sergei 
Stepashin spoke in exaggerated terms about the future of the CIS. Despite the 
divisive 4 June Heads of Government meeting in Minsk, Stepashin looked 
"forward to the future of the CIS with confidence" and was "inspired" by the 
Heads of Government meeting. However, it is difficult to pinpoint the source of 
his inspiration, since the heads of government were unable to make any 
substantive headway on the main issue -- the Free Trade Zone (FTZ). (ITAR-
TASS, 0810 GMT, 21 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1000-0621 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
The current FTZ stumbling block is the introduction of WTO standards in the CIS. 
At the Third Petersburg Economic Forum held in mid-May, CIS Executive 
Chairman Yuri Yarov supported the introduction of WTO standards in order to 
clean up economic practices and facilitate implementation of the FTZ. In contrast, 
the chairman of the Customs Union Integration Committee, Nigmatzhan 
Isingarin, argued against WTO standards, which he fears would interfere with 
FTZ implementation. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 19 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-
0618 <www.fedworld.gov>) Although this concern may be justified within the 
Customs Union -- WTO standards would eliminate preferential treatment 
currently enjoyed by Customs Union members -- it is, however, also plausible 
that the standards may provide precisely the mechanism needed to standardize 
economic practices among all CIS members. 
 
Russia's strategic concerns focus on Western and ethnic threat in CIS 
On the fifth anniversary of the CIS peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia, the 
Georgian government announced that the Russian peacekeeping forces serve 
no purpose since they lack a mandate, have not ensured the safe return of 
refugees and have not promoted a political settlement in the conflict. (ITAR-
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TASS, 1854 GMT, 24 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0624 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
Georgia has further demanded that the peacekeeping forces be deployed as far 
as the Ghalidzga River under international, vice Russian, control. This 
requirement is proving to be disconcerting to Abkhazians and Russians in the 
wake of NATO actions in Kosovo, and Georgia's participation in the West-
oriented GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) group. At 
a meeting of Russian defense officials, President Boris Yel'tsin noted that the 
"threat of major military aggression against Russia remains the realm of theory, 
but the danger of regional conflicts exists." (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 7 
Jul 99) Clearly, an even worse scenario would be a regional conflict escalated by 
Western involvement; however, Yel'tsin says, this remains in the realm of theory. 
 
In an apparent response to the theoretical Western threat, Russia and Belarus 
conducted a week-long strategic security exercise -- ironically named West-99 -- 
beginning on 21 June. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 23 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-99-
0623 <www.fedworld.gov>) Despite Russian assurances to the contrary, the 
exercises -- like the spring air defense exercises in Armenia aimed at repelling an 
enemy flying out of bases in Georgia or Azerbaijan -- clearly posited a Western 
aggressor. Interestingly, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine -- all of whom opted 
out of the CIS Collective Security Treaty -- have expressed interest in NATO and 
house regional hotbeds within their borders. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Pressure, pressure, pressure 
The Chernobyl saga continued this week, as German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder arrived in Kyiv in an attempt "to persuade the Ukrainian government to 
consider non-nuclear alternatives" to completing the construction of two new 
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reactors. Ukraine has said that, until these reactors are completed and begin 
supplying energy, Chernobyl will continue to run. In order to facilitate Chernobyl's 
closure, the G-7 five years ago promised $1.2 billion in loans to assist in the 
completion of these reactors, one each at the Rivne and Khmelnitsky plants. 
However, as discussed in the previous NIS Observed, G-7 countries have 
repeatedly delayed the funding. In fact, just days before the money was finally to 
be allocated last month, the German Bundestag, at the behest of the Greens, 
voted against the loan, and financing was postponed again. Ukraine responded 
by threatening to keep Chernobyl open indefinitely. (See NIS Observed, 23 Jun 
99.) 
 
Last week, both Schroeder and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma were more 
conciliatory than they had been in recent days, but they remained at an impasse. 
After their meetings, Kuchma said he would "examine" all German proposals, but 
emphasized his belief that, "Nuclear energy is the most rational solution because 
it is the cheapest." (FINANCIAL TIMES, 10 Jul 99, p. 2; nexis, and AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, 1402 GMT, 9 Jul 99; nexis) 
 
Meanwhile, Ukraine came under fire from various other sources. Greenpeace 
representatives arrived in Kyiv to contribute their opinion. The group's energy 
expert, Tobias Muenchmeyer, proposed that Ukraine build a natural gas plant, 
since it "would be cheaper and less dangerous to the environment." AP reported 
that "Kuchma rejected Greenpeace's proposal immediately Tuesday, but did not 
say why." (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 0552 EDT, 6 Jul 99; Russia Today) 
 
I wonder why. Could it be because Russia has announced that it needs to begin 
collecting its $1 billion gas and oil debt, and Turkmenistan is insisting that 
Ukraine actually pay something before any more gas is supplied to the country? 
Regardless, such minor details did not deter London's Financial Times 
newspaper, which carried an editorial suggesting, "It is time to reconsider the 
nuclear option in Ukraine." The paper said, "Gas-fired power stations would be 
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much cheaper to build, although more expensive to operate in the long-term. But 
by then, Ukraine will hopefully be more prosperous." (FINANCIAL TIMES, 10 Jul 
99, p. 15; nexis) No doubt, Mr. Kuchma found that a convincing argument. 
 
Germany's Greens have recently abandoned the gas idea, and suggested 
"modernization" of Ukraine's coal-fired plants. Coal? Why not? Ukraine hasn't 
had any problems in that industry lately, after all. 
 
Of a poll and Poles 
President Kuchma may have had to deal with a storm of controversy over 
Ukraine's nuclear reactors, but he had some excellent news from two areas: an 
opinion poll, and his Polish summit. 
 
According to a new presidential election poll conducted by the Sotsis-Gallup 
Company, Kuchma is now significantly ahead in the election race, which will be 
decided on 31 October. It is the first time a poll conducted by Sotsis-Gallup has 
shown Kuchma in front of his nearest opponent, Progressive Socialist Party 
leader Natalya Vitrenko. 
 
Just over 24 percent of those surveyed (1,509 Ukrainians over 18 years old) said 
they would vote for Kuchma, compared to 12 percent for Vitrenko. That marks a 
dramatic decrease in support for Vitrenko, and a significant increase for Kuchma. 
In previous Sotsis-Gallup surveys, both candidates were virtually tied. Kuchma 
garnered 19 percent, 17 percent and 18 percent support in March, April and May, 
respectively, while Vitrenko was supported by 21 percent, 19 percent and 21 
percent of the respondents during those same months. (INTERFAX, 1633 GMT, 
22 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0624 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
It appears that Kuchma recently has been successful in using the power of 
incumbency to his advantage. From his activity concerning Kosovo to a slew of 
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newly signed decrees, Kuchma has taken over the television airways. All 
Vitrenko appears to be able to do at the moment is watch. 
 
One of the presidential activities she undoubtedly viewed with interest was 
Kuchma's summit with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski. The two 
countries appear now to have moved from a period of rapprochement to actual 
alliance. 
 
During the last two years, Ukraine and Poland have solidified economic, military, 
and social agreements, dealing with everything from the re-establishment of the 
Silk Route to a joint peacekeeping battalion to language schools. Now, the 
countries are creating ties between local regions, cities and towns. During their 
24 June summit, Kuchma and Kwasniewski signed "four declarations on 
cooperation between Polish and Ukrainian local government bodies." 
Kwasniewski called it "one of the major Central European events recently." (PAP 
Newswire, 24 Jun 99; nexis) And, it should be noted, it is one of the only foreign 
policy successes of President Kuchma recently. Rebuffed, albeit gently, by 
NATO, and attempting not to be drawn completely back into the Russian sphere 
of influence, Kuchma has turned to his neighbors. Foreign Minister Boris 
Tarasyuk recently outlined Ukraine's current foreign policy plan. According to 
Tarasyuk, the policy involves "unity and reconciliation with Poland ... traditionally 
friendly and warm relations with Hungary, a search for compromises and active 
regional cooperation with Romania and Moldova, a long-time partnership with 
Turkey, ... new prospects with Slovakia, ... [and] strategic partnership with 
Russia." With the success of the latest summit, it appears they've already 
reached their first goal. 
 
BELARUS 
One nation, under Yel'tsin? 
He was patient, but he has finally had enough. Alyaksandr Lukashenka is not 
going to take it anymore. On 2 July, Lukashenka told Russia what he really 
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thought of it, and threatened to do the unthinkable: to befriend the West. Yes, the 
West. The man who just weeks ago accused NATO of planning to invade his 
country has decided that, since the invasion seems to have been delayed, he 
might just want to be friends. 
 
Well, not quite friends. But, during a meeting of the Interparliamentary Assembly 
of the Union of Russia and Belarus, Lukashenka explained that, if Russia doesn't 
give him what he wants, he's turning to the West. What does he want? The long-
promised, but unrealized, union, of course. 
 
"Do you think that I will keep my country in uncertainty for more than five years? 
It looks like Russia does not need us," he exclaimed. "We reach out our hand 
and a stone is placed in it. At the same time we have spoiled our relations with 
the West. . . . I have instructed the Foreign Ministry to maintain the most friendly 
and close relations with all our neighbors, including Western states. We have 
made a gross mistake here." He finished, with a dramatic flourish, "Come to a 
decision finally! Russia should finally determine what it wants." (NTV, 1200 GMT, 
2 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0702 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
Russia, which has spent all of 1999 openly back-stepping after signing the 
Declaration on the Union of Russia and Belarus in December 1998, responded 
quickly and unexpectedly. "The treaty with Byelorussia [sic] is ready. All will be 
decided within a month," Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin said following 
a meeting with Boris Yel'tsin. Yel'tsin was more cautious. "If President of 
Byelorussia Alexandr Lukashenka agrees to the treaty, we shall gradually move 
on and see where it will take us," he said. (ITAR-TASS, 5 Jul 99; nexis) Later 
Stepashin claimed, "The treaty may be signed as early as this autumn." (NTV, 
1200 GMT, 7 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0707 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
All this talk about the signing of the treaty does not deal with what is actually in 
the document, however. The only concrete proposal has been the suggestion 
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that the union have a single currency. Shortly after his meeting with Yel'tsin, 
Stepashin proposed that the Russian ruble be that currency. Given the condition 
of its own currency, Belarus quickly agreed. All other details are still to be 
decided. 
 
Now that Russia seems to be moving forward, Lukashenka is once again back in 
the fold. He is also happy to offer his services as president of the union. That is, if 
Boris Yel'tsin does not take that position. With Yel'tsin's term ending, the Union 
Treaty couldn't come at a better time. Might Yel'tsin have found his way out? 
Would Lukashenka's ego allow it? It's true that there is currently no provision in 
the unification documentation for a president of the union. But that can easily be 
rectified, if both sides want it to be. It's also true that Yel'tsin has denied wanting 
the position, and Yevgeny Seleznev has denied that it is available. But what will 
they say tomorrow? With all due deference to Mr. Lukashenka, could Russia 
have been responding to more than his threats when it put the treaty on the fast 
track? Stranger things have happened. While union president is not a probable 
scenario for Yel'tsin, he is no doubt happy to have the option available, if 
necessary, for June of 2000. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Relations with Bulgaria on the track to nowhere 
Moldovans certainly know how to hold a grudge. In October 1998, when Moldova 
decided to absorb the largely Bulgarian country of Taraclia into a larger county 
where Bulgarians would become a minority, the Bulgar community threatened 
unrest. At the time, the Bulgarian ambassador to Moldova, Petar Vodenski, 
suggested that, if the parliament dissolved Taraclia, Bulgarians may want to 
become part of the Transdniestr region. (For further background, see Editorial 
Digest, 4 Nov 98.) When all was finished, and Taraclia was dissolved, the 
ambassador's threats turned out to be more talk than action. 
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However, the Moldovan parliament this month took its own action when it refused 
to ratify a treaty that would allow Bulgaria to transport nuclear waste by rail 
through Moldova on the way to Russia. That treaty has already been ratified by 
Romania, Ukraine and Russia, and would result in payments to Moldova totaling 
at least $300,000 per year. The parliament seems to have had other 
considerations. Deputy Speaker Valeriu Matei publicly objected to ratifying a 
treaty favorable to a country that interferes with Moldova's internal business. 
(BASAPRESS, 1700 GMT, 24 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0624 
<www.fedworld.gov> and INTERFAX, 8 Jul 99; nexis) The Bulgarian parliament 
also decided recently to introduce visas for Moldovan citizens. 
 
Deputy Prime Minister Nicolae Andronic, who is in favor of the treaty, warned that 
it must be ratified, or the situation "will inevitably affect our ties with Bulgaria." 
(BASAPRESS, 1700 GMT, 24 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0624 
<www.fedworld.gov>) It would seem that those "ties" are already quite unbound. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Transcaucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Why isn't Maskhadov retaliating? 
Reading some recent news reports, one experiences a very unpleasant deja vu. 
In June Russia closed 50 border checkpoints with Chechnya as Chechen fighters 
attacked outposts of the Russian interior ministry in Dagestan. On 30 June ITAR-
TASS broadcast an announcement from the Russian Ministry of Ethnic Policy 
that thousands of Russian residents of Chechnya who lack legal protection under 
Shariah law have fallen victim to violent crime. (1235 GMT, 30 Jun 99; BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts via nexis) Two days later, the ministry called for a 
systematic evacuation of Russians from Chechnya. (RADIOSTANTSIYA EKHO 
MOSKVY, 0900 GMT, 2 Jul 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via nexis) 
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The Russian prime minister and the heads of the power ministries talk of 
achieving a position of strength, adopting tough action, and annihilating bandits. 
Moscow's current rhetoric echoes the pronouncements of the Summer and Fall 
of 1994 and has already culminated in two sets of retaliatory airstrikes in May 
and June and one instance of preemptive airstrikes on 5 July. Some have 
speculated about the possibility that the Chechens may retaliate against Russian 
provocative behavior, igniting another full-scale war. 
 
So why aren't Basaev and Raduev threatening to bring the war to Russian 
towns? Why hasn't Maskhadov taken to the airwaves to condemn Russian 
aggression and brandish the specter of holy war raging across the entire North 
Caucasus? On the contrary, Maskhadov's spokesman, Mairbek Vachagaev, said 
that these aggressive actions constitute Russia's pre-negotiation posturing aimed 
at convincing Maskhadov to make serious concessions at his upcoming meeting 
with President Boris Yel'tsin. This implies that preparation for this long-awaited 
event continues despite the rhetorical flourishes. It further suggests that official 
Dzhokar-gala understands the motivations behind the airstrikes. Vachagaev's 
statement indicates that the Chechen authorities condemn the strikes and 
threaten retaliation (albeit indirectly -- the government may not prove capable of 
restraining some unruly elements) but, significantly, they understand the 
underlying motivations behind Russia's seemingly bellicose behavior. 
(INTERFAX, 1137 GMT, 4 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0704 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
Several new factors support the proposition, suggested in the 23 June issue of 
The Analytical Review, that Stepashin may have secured Maskhadov's support 
for the strikes against units loyal to the field commanders Khattab and Shamil 
Basaev. Both of them operate in the border region, whence they have 
antagonized Moscow by leading raids into Russian territory and exhibited 
independence from Ichkeria's central authorities. 
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In fact, in a 3 July speech to the Federation Council, Interior Minister Vladimir 
Rushailo indicated that Maskhadov was consulted about the strikes: 
 
"We discussed this problem with the [Chechen President] Aslan Alievich 
[Maskhadov] and the Chechen Interior minister. You see it is quite difficult for 
them to fight crime. (...) They are asking us for help and we will help them." 
(RADIOSTANTSIYA EKHO MOSKVY, 1200 GMT, 3 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-
0703 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
Two days later, Rushailo made good on his promise by bombing a unit of roughly 
150 to 200 Chechen fighters at an undisclosed location in the border region 
between Chechnya and Dagestan. Two days after that, he played host for a 
delegation from Ichkeria's interior ministry and signed two protocols on collegial 
relations between the investigative and cadre departments of the Russian and 
Chechen ministries. (ITAR-TASS, 7 Jul 99; via nexis) 
 
Too early for champagne toast 
Could it be that the Russian interior ministry has strengthened Maskhadov's hand 
against his rivals in return for substantial concessions at the upcoming summit 
with the Russian president? If true, this scenario raises vexing questions. 
 
Has Moscow finally adopted a coherent policy in the region? This seems unlikely. 
In fact, on 6 July Izvestia reported that the military "openly sabotaged" Rushailo's 
strategy earlier this Spring. The contradictions between the power ministries 
must impair their ability to carry out operations and effect policies. 
 
Maskhadov must be terribly alienated from Chechen society to strike so Faustian 
a bargain. Over the last year his vulnerability has increased as more 
commanders proved insubordinate and more politicians left the government. In 
fact, he has had to reorganize the government repeatedly to rout his competitors. 
On one occasion in the Spring he imposed a state of emergency in Grozny after 
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units loyal to the government clashed with opposition units. Does this man 
command enough credibility to convince others to accept Russian terms? Will he 
posses the military might to impose such terms? 
 
We should not lose sight of the fact that Dudaev also had powerful rivals and 
also lacked popularity. Yet, the Chechens rallied around him as soon as the 
tanks rolled. On countless occasions during the war analysts predicted that 
individual field commanders in remote locations cut off from the central command 
would make separate deals with the invader. Not one of them ever did. During 
the presidential election and every governmental restructuring over the last two 
years some expected Chechnya to descend into civil war. Despite all the 
devastation and disillusionment in the post-war society, that has not happened. If 
Maskhadov gets too close to the Russians, however, the Chechens may well 
unite behind a far less conciliatory figure. 
 
Time and time again divide-and-conquer tactics have led to catastrophe in this 
region. If Stepashin thinks that he can win advantageous terms by boosting the 
fortunes of an unpopular president, he may again be courting disaster in 
Chechnya. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Relations with Turkey tainted by Uzbek regime's fear of opposition  
The Uzbek government's ongoing campaign against domestic secular and 
Muslim opposition movements has made the leap onto the international arena by 
precipitating a crisis in Uzbek-Turkish relations. President Karimov and his 
administration have apparently come to believe that Turkey bears some 
responsibility for the 16 February bomb attacks in Tashkent, which Uzbek 
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authorities view primarily as an attempt to assassinate the Uzbek president. The 
main facts that led Uzbek officials to draw this conclusion appear to be the 
Turkish government's initial hesitation in granting Uzbekistan's extradition 
request for two Uzbek citizens suspected of involvement in the bombings; 
Turkey's refusal to extradite a third suspect in the bombings, on the grounds that 
he is a Turkish citizen (Turkish law prohibits the extradition of Turkish citizens to 
foreign countries' judicial and investigative authorities); and the Turkish 
government's willingness to grant asylum to Muhammad Solih, chairman of 
Uzbekistan's Erk Party (an outlawed opposition party) for a number of years. 
After Uzbek authorities accused Mr. Solih of being one of the main organizers of 
the bomb attacks, Turkey requested that he leave the country, but this action 
apparently did little to appease the Uzbek government. (AP WORLDSTREAM, 
0910 EDT, 16 Jun 99; nexis) 
 
Turkey recalled its ambassador to Uzbekistan, Umur Apaydin, on 15 June, after 
the Uzbek government began closing Turkish schools and madrasas (religious 
schools) in Uzbekistan and ordered all Uzbek students studying at Turkish 
universities to return home, ostensibly to protect them from Turkish Muslim 
extremist influences. A number of Turkish businessmen working in Uzbekistan 
have also been accused of supporting the Uzbek opposition movements which 
allegedly carried out the bombings in Tashkent. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1530 GMT, 16 Jun 99; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, via 
nexis) 
 
Despite repeated assurances by the Turkish foreign ministry and Prime Minister 
Ecevit himself that Turkey is eager to reestablish good relations with the Uzbek 
government, President Karimov's administration has persisted in portraying 
Turkey as a propagator of Muslim extremism in Uzbekistan. Uzbek authorities 
allege that both Turkish government officials and private entrepreneurs are 
seeking to indoctrinate Uzbekistan's youth with Muslim fundamentalist ideology. 
('OZBEKISTON OVOZI', 6 Jul 99; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, via nexis) Uzbek 
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officials' latest claim is that former Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan 
(leader of the now-disbanded Muslim Welfare Party) was an accessory to the 16 
February events. Mr. Erbakan is accused of donating $100,000 to Tohir 
Yoldosh(ev), the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, in order to help 
carry out the bomb attacks and the assassination of President Karimov. The 
Ankara prosecutor's office has launched an investigation into these accusations 
against Mr. Erbakan and plans to ask Uzbek authorities to hand over all evidence 
supporting their claims. (HURRIYET (Ankara Edition), 5 Jul 99, p. 22; FBIS-
WEU-1999-0705 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
The Uzbek government's recent belligerence toward Turkey and its vilification of 
Turkish businessmen and school administrators who work in Uzbekistan are not 
easy to explain. For the most part, the two countries have enjoyed cordial 
relations and Turkey has assisted in the creation of numerous joint ventures in 
Uzbekistan. At the same time, however, the Turkish government has permitted 
Uzbek opposition members from both Birlik and Erk (the two main secular 
opposition movements, both of which have been banned) to seek at least 
temporary refuge in Turkey. This brought about a short-term chill in Uzbek-
Turkish relations in 1994. The current situation is considerably worse, with the 
Uzbek government so far having rejected all of Turkey's attempts at 
reconciliation. 
 
President Karimov's steadfast refusal to mitigate his anti-Turkish rhetoric is 
beginning to seem somewhat irrational, perhaps even bordering on the paranoid. 
Of all the Middle Eastern Muslim countries, Turkey is the most secularized; both 
the Turkish government and military are known for their deep suspicion of Muslim 
political movements, moderate or otherwise. Furthermore, Turkey has only 
allowed members of Uzbekistan's secular opposition to seek asylum within its 
borders, and after Muhammad Solih became implicated in the Tashkent bomb 
attacks, he was asked to leave the country. Both Prime Minister Ecevit and 
President Suleiman Demirel have issued repeated assurances that Turkey will 
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not permit the members of any groups that pose a threat to Uzbekistan to reside 
on Turkish soil or receive any support whatsoever from the Turkish government. 
(ANATOLIA, 1208 GMT, 16 Jun 99; FBIS-WEU-1999-0616 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
Thus, at this point, there seems to be little else that the Turkish government can 
do, but wait for President Karimov's administration to reestablish normal bilateral 
relations. That the Uzbek foreign ministry has not yet responded to Turkey's 
numerous attempts to resolve the conflict is becoming somewhat mystifying. It is 
clearly the Uzbek government that stands to lose the most in economic benefits if 
the two countries permanently break off relations. Turkey has also often acted as 
an important link between Uzbekistan and the West. With Uzbekistan's recent 
entry into the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) alliance (now 
GUUAM), which had been able to form a very cordial relationship with Turkey, 
friction between the Uzbek and Turkish governments has become even less 
desirable. It is not entirely inconceivable that, if Uzbekistan's hostility toward 
Turkey continues, Turkish leaders' support for the GUUAM alliance will begin to 
waver, as well. Perhaps it is time for President Karimov to temper his rhetoric on 
anti-Uzbek conspiracies and to consider the wisdom of accusing both his allies 
and his enemies of hatching plots against his government before he antagonizes 
his remaining supporters both at home and abroad. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Miller 
 
Discord prevents productive discussion on minorities' issues 
Minority issues once again plagued the Baltic states, but the unresolved conflict 
originated not in the east this time, but in the southwest. A meeting of the joint 
Polish-Lithuanian National Minority Council was scheduled for the end of June to 
calm the roiling relations of ethnic groups outside national boundaries, but few 
problems were resolved. In fact, the level of discord was so high, a pre-meeting 
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meeting of the council could not be held due to mutual disagreement. According 
to Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek, the Polish minority in Lithuania is 
concerned about Lithuania's reform of its administrative and territorial system, the 
reinstatement of land property rights, the issue of spelling names and surnames, 
secondary education, and language exams. Lithuanian Prime Minister Rolandas 
Paksas said the Lithuanian side wanted to include on the agenda discussion of 
Polish education reform and the effects it has had on the Lithuanian minority, the 
legal status of the Lithuanian minority, financing a community center and 
customs post, and the publication of Lithuanian textbooks. (Baltic News Service, 
hereafter "BNS," DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 18 Jun 99) The actual meeting of 
the council in Warsaw, originally planned to last one day, extended to two days, 
and five concerns were discussed. According to Remigijus Motuzas, director of 
the Lithuanian Regional Problems and National Minorities Department, the two 
countries could not reach agreement on the border-crossing station or on the 
spelling of names in official documents. (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 1 Jul 
99) 
 
Adding oil to the waters was the publication of a booklet by the Polish charity 
organization Humanitarian Action, which claimed the Polish minority was "the 
most impoverished and illiterate" segment of Lithuanian society, warned that 
most Polish elementary schools would be closed in the wake of educational 
reform, and charged that the price of a single Polish textbook is the same as an 
entire set of books for a Lithuanian school. When interviewed by Baltic News 
Service, Alexandra Rezumowa, the booklet's author, said she visits Lithuania at 
least every two months and could report that Lithuanian organizations were very 
effective. "However, sharpening the corners of such situation helps attract more 
patrons and sponsors," she said. (DAILY REPORT, 1100 GMT, 24 Jun 99) 
 
Meanwhile, the two countries which habitually receive complaints from Russia on 
the treatment of ethnic minorities report that, domestically at least, integration is 
increasingly perceived to be proceeding smoothly. From Estonia come two 
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separate reports of practical attempts at integration. Education Minister Tonis 
Lukas and Margus Kottise, director of the Narva education department, agreed to 
establish a school with classes to be held entirely in Estonian for Russian 
children in the city. Under the initial plan the new school will open on 1 
September 2001. (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 28 Jun 99) Moreover, it is 
not only the young who are receiving attention and education with the goal of 
integration. Over 1,000 employees of the Estonia Railway Company recently 
completed a three-year program in Estonian and have obtained the required 
proficiency in the language. Students in the course, sponsored by Norway, 
included Russian-speaking employees from all positions in the company. A 
similar teaching effort, on a smaller scale, is scheduled to begin in the Autumn. 
(BNS DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 21 Jun 99) On the international front, Foreign 
Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves reassured OSCE High Commissioner Max van 
der Stoel that language law amendments which establish requirements about the 
minimum level of Estonian fluency for public servants, employees and individual 
entrepreneurs would indeed conform to international standards, and in particular 
would follow European Union standards. (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 11 
Jun 99) 
 
In Latvia, a poll conducted by SKDS in May showed that nearly one-half of the 
country's residents believe integration is proceeding well; not surprisingly, 
however, that perception differs between ethnic Latvians and persons of other 
nationalities. Among Latvians, 53.6 percent believe the process is going 
smoothly, while 38.1 percent of other nationalities agree with that assessment. 
Nearly one-half (48.9 percent) of other nationalities and one-third (32.8 percent) 
of Latvians see the integration process as unsuccessful. According to the poll, 
education levels also reflected differences in perception: Persons with higher and 
secondary education saw more success in the process (46.2 percent and 48.8 
percent, respectively), while 31.3 percent of respondents with basic education 
believed integration was successful. (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 21 Jun 
99) That view does not extend beyond Latvia's borders, apparently. The British 
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Socialist representative to the Council of Europe, Terry Davis, objected to a 
proposal to cease monitoring Latvia, citing the progress still needed in the 
integration of non-citizens. (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1100 GMT, 24 Jun 99) The 
following day, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov reiterated his oft-cited claim 
that Estonia and Latvia continue to violate the human rights of their Russian-
speaking population. (BNS, 0859 GMT, 25 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0626 
<www.fedworld.gov>) He hadn't counted on his charges being refuted by a 
professional linguist or dismissed by an international court. In a live television 
show aired by ORT in Russia, Latvia's new President Vaira Vike-Freiberga 
denied that human rights were at issue. (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 30 
Jun 99) "The Russian language speakers can take their place within Latvia's 
community. The only thing we ask of them is to learn the state language," Vike-
Freiberga said. "[It's] a fundamental courtesy," she added. 
 
While Russia has been the loudest voice charging human rights abuses in the 
Baltic countries, official figures from Strasbourg draw a different picture. Of the 
three Baltic states, Lithuania leads in the number of complaints sent to the 
European Human Rights Court in Strasbourg. Of 167 complaints sent from 
Lithuania, 43 were filed for review. A total of 71 complaints were received from 
Latvia, with 15 applications filed for review. From Estonia, 66 complaints were 
received, and 13 were filed for review. (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 22 Jun 
99) 
 
LATVIA 
Language law continues to incite dialogue 
A change of heart, or political pressure, caused the Saeima parliamentary 
commission to step up its consideration and advancement of the language law 
(earlier reported to be held off until the next parliamentary session began in 
August), and the full parliament scheduled an extraordinary session on 8 July for 
a final reading of the bill. (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 29 Jun 99) Foreign 
Minister Valdis Birkavs took pains to reassure journalists inquiring about external 
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pressure that recent telephone conversations between Birkavs, Stoel and EU 
Foreign Affairs Commissioner Hans van den Broek revolved around the 
commissioners' interest in how the current draft was worded, and involved no 
attempts to force change. (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 30 Jun 99) Birkavs' 
public statement was clearly an attempt to calm the ruffled feathers of MPs who 
had cried "foul" over international intrusion in Latvia's domestic affairs. Although 
warnings from the international community continue to be heard -- leaders of EU 
member states meeting at an economic forum in Salzburg told PM Vilis 
Kristopans that the state language law is the main obstacle to the start of 
membership talks with Latvia (RADIO RIGA NETWORK, 0900 GMT, 3 Jul 99; 
FBIS-SOV-1999-0703 <www.fedworld.gov>) -- on 8 July the Saeima passed the 
law in the third reading, with a vote of 73-16, with an interesting coalition of 
supporters: The People's Party, For Fatherland and Freedom, Latvia's Way, and 
the Social Democratic Workers Party all supported the bill. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 
9 Jul 99) It is now up to newly inaugurated President Vaira Vike-Freiberga to 
promulgate the legislation. 
 
Everything's new again 
While the election of a new president in Lithuania brought some confusion as to 
procedures for the existing prime minister and government (should there be a 
mass resignation, followed by presidential re-appointment?), there was no such 
discussion following the 17 June election of Vaira Vike-Freiberga as Latvia's new 
president. Prime Minister Vilis Kristopans, who regularly assured the country that 
there was no political crisis, did not rush in with a resignation for form's sake. 
Alas, not everyone in the government agreed with Kristopans' reassurances: 
While the prime minister was attending an economic forum in Salzburg, the For 
the Fatherland and Freedom party, part of the ruling coalition, signed a 
cooperation agreement with the leading opposition, the People's Party, which just 
so happens to have remained the most popular party in Latvia since the elections 
eight months ago. (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 1 Jul 99) Citing the 
defection of the coalition partner, Kristopans announced he would resign 
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(INTERFAX, 0648 GMT, 5 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0705 <www.fedworld.gov>), 
leading to the possibility that a stronger government can be formed. The 
announcement by People's Party leader Andris Skele that his party could not 
work with the Social Democrats had precluded a coalition agreement many 
months ago (BNS, 1816 GMT, 26 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-330 
<www.fedworld.gov>), resulting in the weaker coalition led by Kristopans. Skele 
now reports that the People's Party is ready to participate in a new government 
together with the Social Democrats in order to overcome the present crisis. "The 
current situation might call for unusual solutions," Skele said. (BNS, 1759 GMT, 5 
Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0705 <www.fedworld.gov>) 
 
LITHUANIA 
How the West wasn't won over 
Russian military war games titled "West '99" held near the Lithuanian border 
under the leadership of Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev startled 
Lithuanian officials, who said they heard about the maneuvers from the media, 
not from their Russian counterparts. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr 
Avdeev classified the war games as "an ordinary drill," although they featured an 
attack from the West and a counterattack to restored territorial integrity by Russia 
and its allies (here, Belarus). (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1800 GMT, 15 Jun 99) 
Lithuanian Seimas Speaker Vytautas Landsbergis saw nothing "ordinary" in the 
exercises, which he termed instead "a gesture of a psychological cold war." "This 
is a rather audacious political move," Landsbergis said. "The aim of the military 
exercises is Russia and its allies getting ready for winning back the territories by 
military force," he added. Adding credence to Landsbergis' assessment was a 
report by Kommersant-Daily newspaper, which described the military exercise of 
Russian and Belarusian troops as a simulated conflict between Russia and 
NATO over the Baltic states. Because the scenario of the exercise was 
confidential, the newspaper reported, information on the catalyst for action was 
unavailable. (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 22 Jun 99) Given Baltic history -- 
as well as the success of recent audacious moves by Russia (e.g., taking over 
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the airport at Pristina) -- such a scenario is destined to raise at least hackles, if 
not arms. 
 
After Lithuania reproached Russia for its failure to provide advance notification of 
the exercises, the official response from Moscow was less assuaging than 
Avdeev's earlier comments. The Lithuanian foreign ministry voiced the 
expectation that "in the future Russia will follow the Vienna Convention requiring 
a 42-day notice to neighboring states about any activity with more than 9,000 
troops involved." Moscow's response: Russia didn't have to inform Lithuania 
about the maneuvers in advance. "The total number of Russian federation's 
military units which attended the session, West '99, is far from the limit provided 
for in the Vienna document of 1994," according to a press release of the Russian 
Embassy in Lithuania. (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 29 Jun 99) So much 
for hopes of good neighborly relations. Days later, Lithuanian border guards 
stopped 16 members of the Russian military from entering the country when they 
failed to produce a permit for military transit. (BNS, 1020 GMT, 1 Jul 99; FBIS-
SOV-1999-0701 <www.fedworld.gov>)  
 
While not directly linked to the war games, the action resulted from an alertness 
of Lithuanian border guards that is not unwarranted. The mood in at least some 
Russian circles concerning the West '99 games and Moscow's moves to push 
the NATO envelope by sending bomber planes farther westward than required by 
military exercises can best be described as "gleeful." In a radio interview, 
Aleksandr Plyushchev, chairman of the State Duma's Committee on Defense, 
happily recounted that part of the exercise involved the training launch of cruise 
missiles which, although empty for the exercise, were capable of carrying nuclear 
warheads. Moreover, he said, "the Americans virtually missed the flight by our 
two Tu-160 planes and only when the second pair of Tu-95 planes went past did 
they get their act together, as it were, and begin accompanying the planes to 
observe them." (RADIOSTANTSIYA EKHO MOSKVY, 1235 GMT, 2 Jul 99; 
FBIS-SOV-1999-0702 <www.fedworld.gov>)  
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Ignalina's future still uncertain 
Discussions about the safety of the Chernobyl-type reactors once more brought 
Lithuania's Ignalina nuclear power plant to international attention, and the 
responses have been, well, confusing. A report presented at a week-long 
conference sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
welcomed progress made concerning safety issues at East European nuclear 
power plants, but noted particular concern about the extant RMBK-type reactors 
(the type responsible for the Chernobyl disaster). Included in the list was 
Ignalina. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 1642 GMT, 18 Jun 99; FBIS-WEU-
19999-0618 <www.fedworld.gov>) While the European Union has brought 
pressure to bear on Lithuania to schedule specific dates for the plant's closure, a 
subsequent visit by IAEA Director General Mohamed El-Baradei brought glowing 
reports of existing procedures. "The safety standards of running the plant are 
high," he said at the end of his inspection tour. (BNS DAILY REPORT, 1000 
GMT, 28 Jun 99) However, the IAEA director noted that his report and 
recommendations would only be considered advisory, not binding, for a situation 
that must be resolved by Lithuania and the EU. 
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